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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
RUTLEDGE V. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE
MANAGEMENT ASS’N1
The United States Supreme Court upheld an Arkansas law
regulating how pharmacies are reimbursed by pharmacy benefit
managers. In Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management
Ass’n, a unanimous Court decided that Arkansas Act 900, passed
in 2015, was not pre-empted by the federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).
Act 900 ensures that rural and independent pharmacies are
reimbursed by pharmacy benefit managers—the intermediaries
between pharmacies and prescription drug plans—an amount
equal to or higher than the price pharmacies pay to get their drugs.
After the Act’s passage in 2015, Pharmaceutical Care
Management Association, a national trade organization
representing the 11 largest pharmacy benefit managers in the
country, filed suit in the Eastern District of Arkansas alleging the
Act was pre-empted by ERISA. The District Court agreed, and
the Eighth Circuit affirmed that decision. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Act was not pre-empted by ERISA
because it “has neither an impermissible connection with nor
reference to ERISA.”
Justice Sotomayor wrote the opinion and explained that
ERISA pre-empts state laws that govern a “central matter of plan
administration” or that “interfere[] with nationally uniform plan
administration.” However, ERISA does not pre-empt state laws
that “merely increase costs or alter incentives for ERISA plans
without forcing plans to adopt any particular scheme of
substantive coverage.” Neither does it pre-empt state laws that
act immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans or “where the
existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation.”
1

Rutledge v. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n, No. 18-540, 2020 WL 7250098
(U.S. Dec. 10, 2020).
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Because the Court determined that Act 900 amounted only to
indirect cost regulation with no impermissible connection or
reference to ERISA, it upheld the law. Justice Thomas wrote a
separate concurrence because he “continue[s] to doubt” the
Court’s ERISA pre-emption jurisprudence but nevertheless
agreed that the Court properly applied those precedents.
ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN V.
CUOMO2
In one of her first appearances in a Supreme Court decision,
Justice Barrett provided the fifth vote in Roman Catholic Diocese
of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, a 5-4 decision granting temporary
injunctive relief to religious organizations in New York from
strict COVID-19 restrictions imposed by Governor Cuomo. The
Governor’s executive order limited in-person attendance at
religious services to 10 people for services in “red” zones and 25
people for services in “orange” zones, no matter the size of the
facility or the protective measures taken. The Roman Catholic
Diocese of Brooklyn and Agudath Israel of America applied for
emergency relief, arguing that the restrictions in these zones
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
because the restrictions treated houses of worship worse than
comparable secular facilities.
A majority of the Court issued a per curiam opinion ruling
that the applicants were “clearly” entitled to relief pending appeal
because they showed “that their First Amendment claims are
likely to prevail, that denying them relief would lead to
irreparable injury, and that granting relief would not harm the
public interest.” Specifically, the majority noted the discrepancy
between restrictions for houses of worship and businesses
categorized as “essential.” For example, while a church or
synagogue in a “red” zone could not admit more than 10 people,
an acupuncture facility could admit as many people as it wished.
The majority ruled that the restrictions were not “neutral” and
were not likely “narrowly tailored” to survive strict scrutiny.
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh wrote separate
concurrences. Justice Gorsuch’s lively concurrence lamented the
2

Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020).
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strict restrictions imposed on religious services while hardware
stores, liquor stores, bicycle repair shops, and lawyers (among
other things) were considered “essential” under the executive
order. Gorsuch also argued with the dissenting Justices, which
would have denied the applications for various reasons. Chief
Justice Roberts, dissenting, reasoned that injunctive relief was not
warranted because Governor Cuomo had retracted the 10- and 25person limits a few days before the Court’s decision, relegating
the applicants’ facilities to the more favorable “yellow” zone
restrictions. Justice Gorsuch argued that nothing prevented the
Governor from reinstating the challenged restrictions, and “[t]o
turn away religious leaders bringing meritorious claims just
because the Governor decided to hit the ‘off’ switch in the shadow
of our review would be, in my view, just another sacrifice of
fundamental rights in the name of judicial modesty.” Justice
Breyer, dissenting, stressed that injunctive relief is an
“extraordinary remedy” and that it was “far from clear” that the
restrictions violated the Free Exercise Clause.
The Court’s decision came after two prior COVID-19
decisions in which the Court, with the help of Justice Ginsburg,
denied injunctive relief from similar (but less restrictive) limits
imposed on religious services in California3 and Nevada.4 Justice
Sotomayor, in her separate dissent, would have followed those
decisions, arguing that this was an even “easier” case to defer to
the judgment of health officials and executive authorities.

3
4

S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020).
Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020).
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MYERS V. YAMATO KOGYO CO.5
and
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR, CO. V. WALTHER6
In two recent cases, the Arkansas Supreme Court clarified
that Arkansas courts should not defer to agency interpretations of
statutes. In both cases, the justices were unanimous on the point,7
declaring that “agency interpretations of statutes will be reviewed
de novo.”8
Myers involved the interpretation of the Arkansas
“exclusive remedy statute” for purposes of determining whether
the parent companies of a certain corporation were immune from
a wrongful death action brought by the plaintiff after she already
received workers’ compensation following the work-related
death of her husband. The Arkansas Worker’s Compensation
Commission sided with the parent companies, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed that decision. The Supreme Court affirmed but
took the opportunity to clarify the “confusion in prior cases
regarding the standard of review for agency interpretations of a
statute.”
Justice Womack, writing for the majority, explained that
some past cases have adopted a perplexing standard of review in
which the courts decide issues of statutory interpretation de novo,
but an agency’s interpretation is highly persuasive and will not be
overturned unless “clearly wrong.” Citing separation of powers
concerns, the Court decided to abandon the “clearly wrong”
standard and adopt a purely “de novo” standard of review for
agency interpretations. “After all, it is the province and duty of
this Court to determine what a statute means.” The Court further
explained, however, that, in cases where ambiguity exists in the
5

Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., 2020 Ark. 135, 597 S.W.3d 613 (2020).
Am. Honda Motor, Co. v. Walther, 2020 Ark. 349, 610 S.W.3d 633
(2020).
7
Justice Hart wrote a lone dissent in Myers because she disagreed with
the majority’s interpretation of the statute, but she did not express any
disagreement with the de novo standard of review adopted by the Court. The
Court in American Honda was unanimous.
8
Myers, 2020 Ark. 135, at 5, 597 S.W.3d at 617; Am. Honda, 2020 Ark.
349, at 5, 610 S.W.3d at 636.
6
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statute’s text, “the agency’s interpretation will be one of our many
tools used to provide guidance.” This represents a significant
departure from the federal courts’ deferential standard under
Chevron,9 in which federal courts defer to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute.10
American Honda involved the interpretation of the
Arkansas Tax Procedure Act. The Pulaski County Circuit Court
(without the benefit of the Myers ruling at the time) deferred to
the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration’s
(“DFA”) interpretation of the Act. American Honda appealed and
argued that, while the recent Myers case dealt with the
interpretation of a workers’ compensation law, the case decided
more broadly that courts should not give deference to agency
interpretations. The unanimous Supreme Court agreed and cited
Myers for its clarification that “judicial review of the DFA’s
interpretation of the Tax Procedure Act is de novo.”
CLINTON T. SUMMERS

9

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
10
See id. at 843-45.

